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Introduction

The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) has been a point of contention for most
students of Middle Eastern politics. There appears to be a dichotomy of views on the question of
whether Barnas is a legitimate mainstream political organization within Palestine, or whether it is
just another manifestation of the fundamentalist ideology that (according to some people) Islam
seems to encourage. The United States has classified Hamas as a terrorist organization and has
directed some of its efforts of the war on terror against the organization with the aim of
destroying Hamas.
Yet it appears that within the Occupied Territories, Hamas enjoys a substantial amount of
support among the populace. The organization is seen mostly as an alternative to the secular
Palestinian Authority, which is headed by Yasser Arafat. The support seems to peak especially
during times of crisis and Israeli incursions into the territories. Hamas is also very apt at
exploiting the current lack of confidence in the Oslo Accords of 1993. Despite such differing
viewpoints, Hamas has an identity of its own, which like that of most other organizations is
likely to change with time and as the political context changes.
This essay will deal with two main issues. First, it will document the political evolution
that has occurred within Hamas since the beginning of the First Intifada (uprising) in 1988 up to
and including the Second (Al-Aqsa) Intifada. Have the short and long-term political objectives
of Hamas changed? If yes, then in what direction are those changes taking Hamas? Answers to
these questions will be provided by relying heavily on the provisions of the charter of 1988 and
personal statements of the political and spiritual leaders of Hamas.
The second issue of interest is that of determining the factors behind such changes.
Are such changes dictated by external and/or internal actors? It is argued here that the
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Oslo Accords of 1993, integration in the Palestinian political arena, the adversarial role of
the Israeli government, as well as a realization of the current political context in the
region, has caused the stated political objectives of Hamas to become more limited and
pragmatic. Such changes became particularly evident beginning with the signing of the
Oslo accord in September 1993. Is that the case?
If indeed that is the case, then the U.S., Israel, and the Palestinian Authority need

to reconsider their stance toward Hamas. Perhaps a shift in policy may be due. This is
especially important because of the significant political capital that Hamas has
accumulated since the beginning of the First Intifada. It is also important, in the current
context of the "war on terror," to clarify the objectives of Hamas and the extent to which
such objectives fit the description of a terrorist organization. Such an inquiry may then
lay the basis for future investigations on the viability of a solution of the Palestine
question, including Hamas as part of the equation.
I.

Origin and Organizational structure of Hamas

Harakat al-Muqawama al-'Islamiyya (Islamic Resistance Movement) or Hamas, as the
organization is widely known, was "established as a response to the eruption and continuation of
the [first] intifada. " 1 Although it claimed that it provided the inspiration and the push for the
uprising, it was evident that the uprising was instigated by the mood on the street, rather than by
an well-orchestrated organization.
To understand such beginnings, it is well to keep in mind that before Hamas came to the
scene as the embodiment of Islamic values and principles, the Muslim Brotherhood had
developed an extensive network of hospitals, schools, and social services and was respected by
most Palestinians. Given the changing political atmosphere and the increasing frustration of
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Palestinians with the situation in the Occupied Territories (West Bank, Gaza, and East
Jerusalem), the spiritual leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood branch in Gaza decided to take
action.
Up to that time the Brotherhood believed that time for jihad (religious war) had not come
yet, since "the Brotherhood was still going through the phase of Islamic upbringing and
preparation." 2 Nevertheless, it became obvious to the Brotherhood leaders that the killing of a
number of Palestinian workers by an Israeli driver had provided the needed context for its
involvement in the armed struggle against Israel and its attempt to steer the uprising in their
preferred direction.
The first meeting of the Hamas' leadership took place on December 9, 1987 and the first
statement was issued on December 15, 1987 calling on the people to reject the occupation and
3
avenge the blood of the fallen comrades. The organization inherited the Gaza leadership of the

Brotherhood although initially it proclaimed itself independent of the Brotherhood. Ahmad
Yasin, Ibrahim al-Yazuri, Sheikh Salah Shihada, Abd-al-Aziz al-Rantisi and Abd-al-Fattah
Dukhan provided the spiritual and political guidance of the organization and began administering
the Intifada from their headquarters in Gaza.
With the publication of"the communique dated February 11, 1988, the participation of
the Muslim Brotherhood became apparent," but it wasn't until August of 1988 that Hamas
claimed itself to be a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood when it published its charter of that
same year. 4 The declaration signaled a new stage in the development of the organization.
Hamas recognized that its support base among the Palestinian people was increasing daily and
the Brotherhood felt comfortable in claiming Hamas as a byproduct of its movement.
'I
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Given the perilous circumstances under which Hamas members operate, the basic
organizational unit is composed of cells. "The Hamas command structure [is] headed by three
Islamic Congress activists: one responsible for military matters, another for political affairs, and
a third for propaganda and the printing and distribution of handbills (solely authorized by Sheikh
Yasin)." 5
Yasin together with Rantisi are known as the spiritual and political leaders of the
organization. The military wing of the Hamas "is known as the Izz al Din Qassam Brigades,
6
[and] is the force behind most of the violence and killings attributed to Hamas." The Brigades
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were not formally established until 1991 and are usually staffed by fewer than 100 operatives.

In addition, Barnas continues to fund its social projects such as hospitals, schools, and feeding
centers.
Despite continual attempts on the part of Israel and Palestinian Liberation Organization
(PLO) to eradicate the leadership and operatives of Hamas, the organization continues to operate
effectively, although not always at full capacity. Indeed, ever since the First Intifada, Hamas has
continued to gather political capital and has proven a formidable challenge to both the Israeli
Defense Forces (IDF) as well as Palestinian security forces. In the future, one can expect Hamas
to flex its political muscle to achieve its vision for an independent Islamic Palestinian state.

II.

Hamas during the First and Second Intifada: A comparative study
8
According to the Hamas Covenant (Charter) of 1988 , the organization took it upon itself

to engage other forces within Palestine to achieve the goal of regaining possession of the land of
Palestine so that the "banner of Allah [might be risen] over every inch of Palestine" (Article 6).
In this context, the covenant of 1988 is a very important document because it lays out plainly, the
objectives and underlying ideology of the organization.
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According to the charter, the most important objective, indeed the raison d'etre for the
organization, is the liberation of the historical Palestine from the Zionist occupiers. Such an
objective emanates from the belief that "the land of Palestine is an Islamic Waqf consecrated for
future Moslem generations until Judgment Day. It, or any part of it, should not be squandered;
it, or any part of it, should not be given up" (Article 11). Thus it follows that all of Palestine must
be retrieved for the benefit of the future Moslem generations, until the end of the days.
Hamas contends that Israel is an occupying force who has taken over holy Muslim land
forcibly. As a neocolonial state, Israel must be expelled from the territories by way of
persuasion or by force. Given that the balance of power between the Palestinians and the Israelis
is tilted in favor of Israel, there is not much chance that the Hebraic state will disappear by way
of persuasion, or any diplomatic maneuvering. As such, an armed struggle Uihad) must ensue to
ensure the defeat and the expulsion of the occupier from every inch of historic Palestine (Article
15). Time is on the side of justice and truth.
Hamas also does not see much utility in international agreements or conferences on the
Palestine question. This lack of faith in diplomatic initiatives and solutions is reflected in Article
thirteen, where such options are found to be "in contradiction to the principles of the Islamic
Resistance Movement. .. [Such] conferences are only ways of setting the infidels in the land of
the Moslems as arbitrators."

Given the religious importance of Palestine to Islam, such

interference by outsiders is considered unsolicited and ill-gotten. This stance is hardened by the
observable facts that almost always such international undertakings favor the Jewish state vis-avis the Palestinian people. 9
Hamas maintained this adversarial stance towards the Oslo Peace Accord and staked its
reputation on the failure of such talks. As will be demonstrated later, the temporary success of
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the peace talks brought changes in the short-term objectives of the organization. Hamas objected
the Oslo Accord and the Wye Memorandum, as well as other initiatives, partly because of its
stated objectives as enumerated in its covenant. Yet, there were other important factors that
came to play, especially after the "Gaza-Jericho first" and Oslo talks.
The main reason was that acceptance of the peace talks was tied to the recognition of the
state of Israel in what was most of historical Palestine. Coupled with that was the acceptance of
the settlements, which was rendered de facto after the Palestinian Authority (PA), agreed to open
the byways between the settlements and Israel proper. Hamas also objected to the talks, because
the PA was charged with administering the security in the Occupied Territories, which meant
10
that it would be doing the dirty work of the Israeli Defense Forces. Hamas' fears were soon

materialized when the PA arrested hundreds of Hamas activists after a spate of suicide bombings
11
and kidnappings of Israeli soldiers in the early 90s. Lastly, Hamas objected to such talks

because they sidestepped the sensitive issue of the "right of return" of the Palestinian refugees to
their ancestral land.
Besides the objective of the elimination of the state of Israel, Hamas declares that any
Palestinian state would have to be one based on the principles of Koran. Article eight of the
Covenant reads, "Allah is its target, the Prophet is its model, the Koran its constitution .... "
Hamas envisions an Islamic state where others would be allowed to exercise their religion. It
contends that only "under the wing of Islam it is possible for the followers of the three
religions ... to coexist in peace and quiet with each other. Peace and quiet would not be possible
except under the wing oflslam" (Article 31).
In addition, although it proclaims brotherhood with all other Palestinian liberation forces,
Hamas maintains that only when those organizations abandon the secularist path will Hamas
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become "its soldiers, and fuel its fire that will burn the enemies" (Article 27). Considering its
deep religious background, Hamas is unwilling to compromise its religious ideology and
objectives in exchange for closer cooperation with other secular forces, such as the PLO, which
is headed by Y asser Arafat.
Thus, when Hamas was first established and during the first years of its existence, its
position on essential issues such as the recognition of the state of Israel, acceptance of
international mediation, nature of a future Palestinian state and the relationship with the PLO
was inflexible and highly ideological. It maintained a strictly Islamic perspective and did not
recognize realities such as the Israeli military supremacy, sympathy of the United States for the
state of Israel, and need to work within a political framework with other secular Palestinian
political organizations.
Beginning with 1993, Hamas adopted a new strategy. Whereas prior to that time it had
rejected any international diplomatic solutions, Hamas now showed that it was willing to
compromise and accept the agreements, although it still maintained an adversarial position
towards the Oslo accords. Such changes were signaled by communiques sent out by Shaykh
Yasin, the spiritual leader of the movement. The communiques indicated that Hamas would be
willing to agree to a cease-fire "of ten or even twenty years with Israel iflsrael would withdraw
from the occupied territories."
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Note that occupied territories here include West Bank, Gaza

Strip and Arab (East) Jerusalem.
In addition, other declarations from leaders in Amman, Jordan, confirmed this new
strategy by declaring that Hamas would be willing to work with the PA, Egyptian and Jordanian
governments if Israel were to withdraw. Such statements implied that Hamas accepted the
outcome of the Oslo accords, from which the PA drew its authority.
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In the recent years, the
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position towards Oslo has hardened again given the failure of the agreement to bring peace and
stability in the region, and because it feels that the accords have been abandoned completely by
the U.S. and Israel.
Although rhetorically Hamas rejects categorically the two-state solution, in practice its
leaders have indicated a willingness to accept that alternative. In a recent interview, Abd al-Aziz
Rantisi, a senior official of Hamas political wing, implied that if Israel were to accept the notion
of a Palestinian state, then Hamas would be willing to reciprocate by recognizing the state of
Israel. 14 During the same interview, Ismail Abu Shanab commented,
Hamas is focusing on an agenda for Israel's withdrawal from the lands taken in
1967, the establishment of a Palestinian state and a solution for the refugees ... If
these things are implemented, the Palestinians will be satisfied, and they will be
busy for more than 20 years building their state. The new Palestine can have good
relations with Israel, as well as with the rest of our neighbors. 15
Clearly, Hamas has seen a need to compromise its long-standing adversarial position
towards the two-state solution. By accepting the possibility of a Palestinian state composed of
West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem, Hamas has also given the green light to international
mediation, which it rejected in the covenant of 1988.
Also starting with 1993, Hamas began its rapprochement towards the PA. After a series
of confrontation with the PA, between 1993 and 1995, "Hamas' Gaza leadership, intent on
averting more crises that risked leading to civil war, agreed to take part in an interfactional
dialogue with the PA [and that] it would have to act alongside the PA." 16 As part of this new
strategy, Hamas' leadership considered the possibility of running in the Palestinian legislative
elections envisioned under Oslo. Although continued clampdown on the part of the IDF and the
PA caused Hamas to decide against running, seven Hamas sympathizers won seats in the
Palestinian Legislative Assembly.
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Prior to and following the signing of the Taha Agreement in September 1996, Hamas
negotiated "a sixteen-point agreement with the Authority ... The understanding behind the text
was that the PA would treat Hamas as a bona fide political opposition" .17 Two years later, after
his release from prison, Shaykh Yasin reiterated the need for closer cooperation with the PA by
noting that "we are one nation. We're fighting the same goal, and we have one enemy, so we've
no choice but to unite." 18
Despite the ups and downs in its relationship with the PA, Hamas has continued to seek
common ground with the Authority. During summer and fall of 2002, there was extensive
cooperation between Hamas and the Fatah, culminating with their meeting in Cairo. The talks
were also encouraged by the EU foreign ministers who held various meetings with both parties
as well. 19 Al-Zahhar, one ofHamas political leaders in Gaza, indicated that "a secretariat ha[d]
been established. We named someone and Fatah named another. The two got together to lay
down the action programme, the schedule of the meetings, and the subject to be discussed. "20
The cooperation went so far as to include an understanding that Hamas would join a
"collective leadership outside the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) framework, in fact above
it." 21 This compromise would bring Hamas into the governing body in return for a promise to
give up independence in choosing operating methods and targets for attacks.
In the process of cooperating with the PA, Hamas has made sure that its stance towards
the nature of the future Palestinian state remained unchanged. Still, recent comments by some
Hamas leaders hint to an attempt to tie an Islamic Palestinian state to a democratic one. These
leaders argue that democracy and Islam are compatible and capable of coexisting in the same
system.
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In a recent interview, Abu Shanab remarked that" ... an Islamic state is compatible with
democracy. In this way, we see the Israelis as part of this community, if they want to live as
equals." 22 During the same interview, Yasin echoed the same view, saying that "my own best
vision for Palestine is of a land for Christians, Jews, Muslims - a state where everyone has equal
rights. " 23 Then he added that the question of whether a Palestinian state would have to be an
Islamic state should be left to the democratic process. "Let the people select the kind of state
they want, in the same way that United States is a state for all its people and they solve their
differences democratically as equals. "24
Although such declarations are far from repudiations of Barnas' objective of setting up an
Islamic state, they do indicate a change in approach and mentality. When scrutinized in the
context of the current analysis, such small concessions on such poignant issues paint a bigger
picture of an evolution within Barnas. To be sure, hard-line elements remain within the
organization, but over the past 15 years Barnas has evolved into a powerful as well as a rather
moderate force in the Palestinian political arena. The remainder of this text will analyze the
factors that caused such changes.
III.

Attributable causes for changes in political objectives

The road toward political legitimacy has been bumpy and rough for Barnas. Frequent
clampdowns by both IDF and Palestinians security forces, avoiding antagonizing the
Palestinian people while Oslo Accords seemed to work, and offering a viable alternative to
the suffering of the people, proved at times insurmountable obstacles for the organization.
Three particular factors affected Barnas to a greater degree than others. These factors
dictated a change in short-term (and possibly long-term) political objectives.

a. Effects of Oslo Accord

According to Kristiansen (1999) "Oslo came about largely as a result of Hamas'
challenge to the PLO and Israel. In turn, Oslo has been the great challenge faced by Hamas. " 25
Hamas has staked its credibility upon the failure of the Oslo accords and Arafat's
accommodation with Israel. Because of recent developments, culminating with the al-Aqsa
Intifada, Hamas has been able to garner popular support, but it has been unable to supplant the
PA as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. 26
Following the signing of the Oslo accord in September 1993, Hamas was constantly
outmaneuvered by the emerging PA and the Israeli government, despite its best efforts to offer
alternative viable choices to the Palestinian people. With the establishment of the PA in 1994
and the introduction of autonomy in Gaza and Jericho, Hamas was pushed out into the fringe of
the political arena and had to cooperate for its survival. Palestinians within the territories
favored the peace process as the only viable altemative. 27 As such, Hamas could not criticize the
PA and in tum directed its activities inside the borders oflsrael.
Also, the signing of the Oslo agreement gave Arafat political leverage to go after Hamas
by force, if needed. 28 This new reality forced upon the organization the need to adopt a more
pragmatic approach. Even long-time leaders of the organization, such as Yasin, Rantisi and
Musa Abu Marzuq, favored such an approach and steered Hamas towards a more moderate
position. Evidence of such change has already been presented, quoting Yasin and Rantisi with
regards to their recognition of the PA and their stance towards a two-state solution. Their
recognition of the guidelines set up by the Oslo accord also falls within the framework of such
changes.

b. Cooperation and Struggle with Fatah and the role of the Israeli government
During the first Intifada and up to the signing of the Oslo accords, Hamas mounted a
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significant challenge to the authority of Fatah and the PLO (its umbrella organization). For a
while there was even a fear of a civil war between the secular and the religious groups. 29 After
the signing of the accords, Hamas recognized the strength of the new PA and chose cooperation
over confrontation. 30 Yet, not all matters were resolved peacefully.
Arafat was keen on flexing his muscles against Hamas sympathizers and repeatedly
imprisoned and harassed them. Under the Oslo agreement, it was the PA' s responsibility to
eradicate radical elements within the occupied territories. Tensions ran especially high after
Hamas' military wing undertook retaliatory actions against Israel following the Hebron massacre
on 25 February 1994. Pressured by the Israelis and the U.S., Arafat ordered the rounding up of
more than 400 Islamist activists in the Gaza Strip. This was followed by clashes between
Palestinian police forces and Hamas activists at Gaza's Palestine Mosque on 18 November 1994
where 14 people were killed.
The effects of such confrontations, imprisonment, and political assassination of Hamas
leaders were soon evident and became more burdensome as the IDF was involved in cleansing
operations. 31 The void was filled by a "new generation ofHamas politicians. The 'Intifada
graduates' in the thirties and early forties, had been educated in Palestinian universities and had
shared schoolrooms, as well as prison cells, with their Fatah counterparts. More attuned to the
secular nationalist discourse and frequently with direct lines to PA officials, this younger, highly
pragmatic generation was used by Hamas in its dialogue with the PA. " 32
By temporarily eliminating the core leadership ofHamas by way of imprisonment and
exile, the PA and Israeli government were able to mold a new moderate leadership. This change
in leadership, with these new highly pragmatic individuals, brought about moderation in the
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rhetoric. Although most of the leaders have been released from jail, this pragmatic outlook
remains to this day.

c. The trap of political legitimacy
As an organization that depends heavily upon the support of the populace, Hamas is very
sensitive to the mood on the street. While it continued to oppose the peace talks and criticized
the role the PLO played in those talks, Hamas was careful not to portray itself as antagonistic
towards the sentiment of the ordinary Palestinian. Under such conditions even the military
operations against Israeli targets, especially right after Oslo, became more problematic. Hamas
now "had to take into account the often volatile public mood. Thus, even though it adopted a
policy of tying military operations to Israeli outrages, mass anger at Israel could quickly be
overshadowed by the effects of collective punishment."

33

Knowing that Hamas was better handled by dealing with it as a political force, the PA
attempted several times to incorporate Hamas within the political framework. Hamas rejected
such offers because in principle it was against the Oslo accords. This attitude has changed over
time. As mentioned earlier, as recently as December 2002, Hamas and Fatah officials met and
discussed the possibility of cooperation. One of the issues of interest discussed was the question
of legislative elections.
Hamas had expressed interest as early as 1994 in participating in legislative elections.
Shaykh Yasin dictated a letter from his prison cell that indicated Hamas should be "challenging
the legislative institution from within by participating in the electoral process planned for
establishing an autonomous Palestinian Council." 34
Such developments imply willingness on the part of Hamas to play by political rules.
When it finally participates in a national-unity government, Hamas' retaliatory policy will be
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subject to approval by a governing body that may be a cross-section of secular and Islamic
organizations, not all of which share the same attitude about what is the most desirable means of
securing Palestinian independence. In this case, Barnas would find itself bound by the political
legitimacy, which it is seeking to gain in order to achieve its objectives. Indeed, the current
developments point towards a greater cooperation with Fatah.

Conclusion
Much has changed since Barnas was first organized over 15 years ago. The Palestinians
are currently waging their second Intifada and living conditions in the Occupied Territories have
deteriorated considerably. Thousands have been killed on both sides of the conflict and many
more are wounded. Suicide bombings occur almost daily and there doesn't seem to be any light
at the end of the tunnel. Barnas now claims a considerable following and has become a
permanent fixture of the Palestinian political debate.
Meanwhile, some things have remained the same. Arafat is still the representative of
Palestinian aspirations, the settlements are still intact, and Palestinians live in refugee camps.
Also, the United States has yet to become a true and honest broker for a peace agreement
between the two parties in the conflict. Even more interestingly, a Bush is in the White House
and the U.S. just completed a successful military operation against Iraq.
What effect, then, have these last 15 years had on Barnas? Are Barnas' political
objectives as militant and highly ideological as they once were? Are its leaders, still unwilling to
compromise their stance on international mediation and the possibility of a two state solution?
What about the secular Palestinian organizations, has there been a rapprochement between them
and Barnas? It is evident form the discussion above that changes have occurred and the
changing political context has dictated Barnas the necessity of compromise. It is this ability
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and/or willingness to change that has assured Hamas' survival. Much like a phoenix rising out
of the ashes, Hamas has demonstrated resilience and a certain degree of pragmatism.
Some may argue that Hamas' change of heart on such poignant issues, as the two-state
solution for example, is only cosmetic. They comment on the fact that Yasin only asks for 10-20
years of cease-fire, not more. The motive for such a concession, it is believed, derives from the
realization that, at the present, Palestinians are not strong enough militarily to face-off Israel.
Perhaps, 10-20 years later, a stronger Palestinian state could muster the strength to defeat the
state of Israel and reclaim the land that has been unjustly taken from them.
There is certainly some validity in the argument, and Israeli policy makers must consider
it a very good reason for not providing the Palestinians with that privilege. Nevertheless, when
one surveys the Palestinian political arena, it becomes evident that the path proposed by Hamas
is not the only alternative, indeed it is not even the most sought after one. More importantly, it is
the picture that emerges during and in the aftermath of changes in the political context.
Evidently, Hamas has not been immune from such evolutionary periods, especially as new
leaders with ties to the wider Palestinian political community emerge.
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